CLASSIFICATION STATE Approved For RENEWS 2005 06 P. OFF ARE PSY 2004 25 7 X 0 8 2005 2009 INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. 25X1 30 July 1951 COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone) DATE DISTR. SUBJECT HVA Summer Camp Investigation Report NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1 PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. **ACQUIRED** Free Committee THE WAR DATE OF SUPPLEMENT TO INFO. REPORT NO. 25X1 This document contains impolliation application the inational deverse of the upited synthet are examine of the especiation act to (J. A., 2) and 83, 46 and 820 to transmission of the expelation of the expelation of the expelation of the contents in any manner to an examined person is preclimate of the expelation of this point is proclimated. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 25X1 25X1 observations made during an inspection of the Volkspolizei in their summer camps. The inspection disclosed that while a few units seemed to be in satisfactory condition, the training of the bulk of officers and men left much to be desired. \* 25X1 The principal criticisms were the following:

- 1. The organizational, political, and logistic preparations for the summer training period were generally satisfactory, in some instances unsatisfactory, and could be rated good only in three units: those commanded by Inspekteur Thiele and Kommandeure Riedel and Weise. The most frequent weaknesses were:
  - a. The political and ideological preparation was often poor. While the SED was frequently requested to aid the preparations, the FDJ was rarely consulted.
  - b. The lack of political control over the troops in the summer camps demonstrated insufficient preparation by the political staff officers.
- 2. The political staff officers seem to have underestimated the importance of assigning capable personnel to the summer training camps. The plans for political activity after hours were often woefully incomplete and, where plans were made, the execution was frequently poor. Political training during field exercises was often omitted. In some cases the political staffs failed to exploit the high morale prevailing upon arrival in the summer camp and thus lost valuable ground gained by the political officers in the home garrisons. In general, it has been noted that coordination between the various groups charged with political supervision of the units has been very poor indeed.
- 3. The directive published by the party for organization of political indoctrination during duty hours is inadequate. In some cases the weekly hours allotted were all lumped together in one period. In other cases they were poorly arranged, thus weakening the effect of the instructions; and finally the instructions were often held in unsuitable locations under conditions of poor acoustics and sometimes out of doors in inclement weather. It was also noted that political instruction during the early training phases had an adverse effect upon the morale of the troops. The public

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address systems were sometimes used improperly to the detriment of the instructions. The guidance of political activists within the various units by the political staff section was also inadequate and led to dissatisfaction.

- 4. The instructions issued by the HVA for establishing summer training camps were frequently disregarded. There were instances in which the commanding officers made no personal reconnaissance of the area selected by their staffs, and many times the staffs making the selection had not taken into account all the directives issued for the purpose. The location of some summer training areas is too close to residential districts or main traffic arteries so that the camps are open to public observation. The use of civilian facilities for sumplies, maintenance, and recreation, violates security rules.
- 5. In many units the master training schedule for May 1951 did not place sufficient emphasis on the preparations necessary for the move to summer training camps.
- 6. Frequently no written orders for occupation of the summer training cames were published and, consequently, in the fragmentary, verbal orders many important aspects were overlooked. Such orders as were issued in writing were often vague, incomplete, and ambiguous.
- 7. Proper supply of the troops in the field as well as sanitary measures were neglected. In some cases no latrines had yet been provided two days after the troops occupied the area. In other cases mess areas were left unpoliced for as long as 14 hours after consumption of the last meal. It was also noted that garbage disposal was often arranged through local farmers, a procedure which violates basic security measures.
- 8. There were numerous instances in which interior guard duty was poorly organized and inadequate.
- 9. Training schedules for the summer training phase did not meet all requirements and were in most cases unsatisfactory. Many units simply used existing garrison training schedules without regard for the changed conditions, requirements and opportunities. Training methods and officer training schedules were acceptable in only a few cases.
- 10. In general, all units started their field training period at least one day late,

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